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▪ WFM is overvalued given that the price delivered by an 
intense analysis is $30,21 which is 13,67% lower than the 
market value on 31st of May 2017. Furthermore, the remaining 
methodologies used to give robustness to the model also yielded 
values lower than $34,99. 
▪ Current environment in natural and organic sector is 
tough with an increasing competition due to the entrance of large 
national supermarket chains and the deterioration of gross margins 
as a result of price investments and deflation environment. 
▪ The reaction of WFM to the current industry conditions 
has been through the following measures: creation of a store 
concept (“365 Stores”), e-commerce, reduction of cost structure 
and a more aggressive marketing and advertising strategy. 
▪ On 16th of June it was announced the WFM’s acquisition 
from Amazon which was concluded on 29th of August. Jeff Bezos 
company paid $42 per share which corresponds to a premium of 
20% compared to stock price on 31st of May and 39% compared 
to the analyst valuation. So, why did Amazon pay that premium? 
Excess of liquidity, cross-selling, the incorporation of a new sales 
channel (brick-and-mortar stores) and possibility to scale and 
leverage the WFM’s business are some of the explanations. 
Brief company description 
WFM is the largest supermarket chain of natural and organic foods 
in the US. The company was founded in 1980 in Austin and 
nowadays it is operating in three countries (US, Canada and UK) 
with a total of 456 stores. WFM offers a broad selection of natural 
and organic products with a strong emphasis on perishable foods. 
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Executive Summary 
 
My advisor recommended me to develop an Equity Report about a company that 
had been acquired at a short time ago in order to relate the Work Project with my 
job in KPMG (Deal Advisory). The purpose would be to compare my analysis with 
the market price at that time and with the transaction value. Consequently, I have 
chosen one of the transactions of 2017: the acquisition of WFM by Amazon. 
Whole Foods Market (WFM) is an American corporation which operates 
exclusively in the natural and organic products industry. Founded in 1980 in 
Austin, Texas, 37 years later represents part of the American retail industry 
having more than 450 stores spread over three different countries.  
Despite being a premium brand focused on delivering high quality products to 
customers who highly value such product differentiation, WFM has been facing a 
few challenges in the last couple of years due to a paradigm change in its 
market. The deflation environment and the aggressive entrance of new players in 
the sector have been impacting WFM business, slowing down the growth pace of 
the company as well as its margins. This environment is challenging the 
dynamics of the company which is trying to react proactively to the market 
pressures, so it won’t be captured by new players. 
The valuation of the company was computed through three different 
methodologies: Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model, trading comps and 
precedent transactions. Each methodology yielded a different value but for the 
recommendation was chosen a final price given by DCF ($30,21). The price 
interval found through the methodologies above is [$26,90, $33,38] with a 
median of $31,02 and an average of $30,44. As of 31st of May, the share price 
was $34,99 and, consequently, the computed price lead to the conclusion that 
WFM share price was overvalued at this time. 
In 29th of August of 2017, WFM was purchased by Amazon, an acquisition that 
had already been announced on 16th of June of the same year. The transaction 
value was $13,7 billion which means a value per share of $42. This represents a 
premium of 39% comparing to the analyst valuation and 20% regarding to the 
stock price on 31st May of 2017 ($34,99). 
A more detailed information about the current and forecasted environment and 
WFM’s reaction to this big challenge together with some facts and figures about 
the company and its financials are presented in the next chapters. Ultimately, 
explanations regarding the premium paid by Amazon are also discussed in the 
following sections. 
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Company Overview 
 
Company Description 
 
Whole Foods Market (WFM) is a retail chain headquartered in Austin, Texas 
(United States) focused on natural and organic products which operates in three 
countries: US, Canada and UK. The share of each country in overall revenues 
can be seen in Figure 1. The first store was opened in Austin to the public in 
1980 and in November 2016, WFM had 464 stores of which 444 were in the U.S., 
11 in Canada and 9 in the UK. The WFM Initial Public Offering (IPO) was in 1992 
at a price of $2,125 per share. In 2015, WFM created a new concept “365 
stores” whose concept was to make stores smaller and cheaper. 
The expansion to Canada took place in 2002 with the inauguration of its first 
international store in Toronto while the entrance in the UK market happened in 
2007 with the opening of its first store in London. Its stores have an average size 
of 39000 gross square footage which corresponds to around 3623 square 
meters. Regarding product category, in the fiscal year 2016, 67% of sales were 
perishables (19% prepared foods and bakery and 48% other perishables) and 
the remaining non-perishables. These ratios have been stable over the last few 
years.  
In the fiscal year 2016, revenues were $15,7 billion and EBITDA was around 
$1,4 billion with a net income of $507 million. WFM was an industry-leader in 
sales per gross square foot with a value of $915. Furthermore, in the U.S., 
WFM is the market leader in natural and organic foods sector and the 10th 
largest food retailer overall based on 2015 sales rankings from Progressive 
Grocer. By analysing WFM past performance (Figure 2 and Figure 3), it is 
possible to conclude that although sales have been increasing every year since 
2009, operating income and margins have been decreasing. This is a 
consequence of lower prices and consequently, lower margins of the company’s 
products. Moreover, the tougher environment in the industry is also reflected in 
the performance of comparable stores which also worsened in 2016 (Figure 4). 
The chain has around 87000 team members (as of September 2016) of which 
69% are full-time workers with a turnover of 18%. In the last two decades, WFM 
has been recognized as one of the “100 Best Companies to Work for in 
America” by FORTUNE’s magazine. 
365 Everyday Value, Allegro Coffee and Whole Paws are some of WFM’s 
exclusive brands. These together with temporary exclusive products are key 
components of the differentiation and product innovation strategy adopted by 
Figure 1: Revenue split by Geography 
Source: Annual Report 
Figure 3: Company Performance Evolution 
Source: Annual Report 
Figure 2: Net Sales ($bn) evolution   
Source: Annual Report 
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WFM. The exclusive brands has increased its share in overall WFM sales and 
in the fiscal year of 2016, it represented around 15% of total retail sales. 
Additionally, the retail chain has an important role for the communities where 
WFM is a bridge between suppliers and consumers. Thus, through Whole Planet 
Foundation, Whole Kids Foundation and Whole Cities Foundation, the company 
contributes to enhance the life of those facing major difficulties by providing 
microcredit to developing world communities that supply their stores, improving 
children’s nutrition, teaching, educating and supporting families and, lastly, 
supplying healthy food to poor communities. Finally, WFM is concerned about 
environmental sustainability and so, in 2014, the company announced its 
commitment to reduce 20% of its energy consumption by 2020. 
Management Team 
 
Over the last few months, there have been many changes on the Board of 
Directors, on the Management Team and on how the top of hierarchy of the 
company is organized. The main one was the transition from co-Chief 
Executive Officers (John Mackey and Walter Robb) to a sole CEO in January 
2017, with the co-Founder John Mackey (63) embracing that role alone. Walter 
Robb (63) remained on the Company’s Board of Directors and continues to be 
responsible for Whole Kids and Whole Cities Foundations.  
Another important amendment was the replacement of the Executive Vice 
President and CFO Glenda Flanagan. She served the company as CFO for 29 
years, the longest serving female CFO in the Fortune 500. She retired and was 
replaced by Keith Manbeck (CFO effective May 2017) who was the former vice 
president of Kohl’s. Also, in May 2017, the chairman John B. Elstrott was 
replaced by Gabrielle Sulzberg, a private equity executive. Besides these main 
shifts, since November 2016, five new directors were nominated (Ken Hicks – 
former CEO of Foot Locker, Joe Mansuetto – founder and chairman of 
Morningstar, Sahron McCollam – former CFO of Best Buy, Scott Powers - a 
former vice president of State Street Corporation and Ronald Shaich – the 
founder and co-CEO of Panera Bread Company). In a board contemplating 
twelve directors, ten of them are independent, nine are current or former 
CEOs/CFOs and four are female.  
There is a possibility that more adjustments can occur on the Board of Directors 
because one of WFM’s main shareholders (Jana Partners) is negotiating with the 
Board to add two directors since the fund argues that the company is in need of 
even more “fresh blood”. 
Figure 4: Comparable store sales growth 
Source: Annual Report 
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The company has completely changed its top in an attempt to add more 
expertise and ideas to shape and prepare WFM for the new future conditions. 
Shareholder Structure 
 
According to Bloomberg, WFM is mainly owned by private institutional 
investors (77,6%), followed by treasury shares (18,8%) which are shares 
issued in the name of the company that are not outstanding. Besides these two 
big portions, individuals hold 1,42% of WFM and the remaining 0,98% is held by 
employees (including indirect beneficial ownership, all directors and officers as a 
group) - Figure 5. Yet it is important to highlight that the CEO John Mackey has 
979 975 shares (as of April 2017) which corresponds to around 0,3%. 
According to Orbis database and 10K quarterly report, the main shareholders 
(with more than 5% of the company) are the Vanguard Group (9,69%), Jana 
Partners (it acquired 8,2% of WFM in April 2017) and also BlackRock, Inc with 
8,15%. 
In 2016 dividends were $0,54 per common share which shows a slight increase 
compared to the $0,52 in 2015. In 2013, the dividend was not in line with the 
remaining years due to an extraordinary payment of $1 during the 4th quarter. 
The expected dividend per common share for that year was $0,40 which would 
mean a dividend payout ratio of 27%. In the last two years, the dividend payout 
ratio was around 35%. As will be referred below, WFM stock price has been 
heavily decreasing since 2013. Consequently, believing its share price has been 
undervalued, since 2014 WFM has been repurchasing stocks as it can be seen 
in Figure 6. 
Stock Performance 
 
Since the financial crisis, WFM’s share price can be split in two different 
periods. The first one is until 2013, in which the company outperformed by far 
the related indexes, Figure 7. This can be explained by the good results, the high 
growth rate and ambitious forecasts for the natural and organic niche market. 
However, since 2013, although main American stock indexes kept rising, Whole 
Foods Market experienced a free fall and lost around half of its market 
capitalization in 3 years (382,86 vs 186,02). This correction was due to worse 
results than those expected by shareholders, higher competition in the organic 
and natural products sector, food price deflation, waning store traffic and price 
investments (deteriorating gross margins). In the last two months, WFM’s share 
has been performing consistently well mainly due to the expectation of an 
acquisition of WFM, after Jana Partners (a private equity fund) acquired 
around 8% of the company. Overall, WFM has underperformed the related 
Figure 5: Shareholder Structure         
Source: Annual Report & Bloomberg 
2013 2014 2015 2016
EPS 1,48$        1,57$        1,49$        1,55$        
DPS 1,40$        0,48$        0,52$        0,54$        
Div. payout ratio 95% 31% 35% 35%
Total div. paid ($M) 519$         176$         186$         174$         
Share rep. ($M) 125$         578$         513$         944$         
Total payout ratio 117% 130% 130% 221%
Figure 6: Dividend & Share Information 
Source: Annual Report 
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Figure 7: Stock Performance              
Source: S&P Indices & Investing.com 
indexes since 2009 as it is noticeable in Figure 7 and, as a consequence of, its 
poor performance, WFM ceased to be part of Nasdaq100 in December 2016. 
 
 
 
 
  Value Drivers 
 
 
Brand Value 
 
WFM has been building a strong brand since its inception with an excellent 
reputation where customers feel it is reliable to purchase high quality products 
which allows WFM to sell at higher prices than its competitors. The new industry 
conditions obliged WFM to invest in advertising to promote its unique qualities 
and remember customers why they should pay more to shop in WFM instead of 
going to a competitor and pay considerably less. Furthermore, WFM is also 
focused on gathering data and marketing information in order to optimize 
supermarket organization and product selection to retain its customers and 
maximize its sales. Therefore, the company has increased substantially its 
marketing and advertising expenses in the last few years as Figure 8 shows.  
Opening new stores 
 
The supermarket chain has been increasing its stores aggressively hence its 
total square footage has also sharply increased, Figure 9. Since 2009, the total 
gross square footage increased by 68% while the number of stores only 
increased 60% which means that the average size per store also rose. Regarding 
the location of stores, it is noticeable in Figure 10 that it is not homogeneous 
per state since, for example, California has 84 stores while in some states WFM 
is not present. This is related to WFM strategy of being located in rich regions 
with high density and which are also healthy and environmentally aware. For the 
future, the plan would be to “cross the 500-store mark in fiscal year 2017” and to 
achieve long-term goal of 1200 stores in U.S. and 40 stores in Canada and UK, 
making the opening of new stores the main driver for growth. However, WFM 
sales have been slowing down in the last two years, specially sales per sq ft as it 
is noticeable in Figure 4 for comparable stores, which made WFM abandon that 
path. From now on, it is expected to continue to be one of the main drivers of 
Figure 8: Marketing & Advertising 
expenses                  
Source: Annual Report 
Figure 9: Stores and Total Square Footage 
Evolution                    
Source: Annual Report & eMarketer Retail 
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growth but in a more disciplined way since the aggressive unit expansion in the 
past was not followed by the demand growth needed. Moreover, the aggressive 
expansion has also caused cannibalization in some sites which is one of the 
main explanations for the deterioration of the performance of each store. 
Summarizing, WFM will continue to expand the number of stores but in a more 
conservative way than in the past. 
365 Stores 
 
365 Stores concept is a WFM’s answer to the new environment in the natural and 
organic niche market. The company faced a dilemma: to decrease prices while 
not affecting heavily operating margins neither the quality since it was vital 
for WFM to not damage customer’s perception of its brand excellence. Thus, in 
order to answer this challenge, WFM came up with a new concept where they 
can set lower prices, offsetting that with lower structure costs (less employees 
per sqm counterbalanced by technological improvements, simpler stores, smaller 
footprints and a higher percentage of exclusive/own brands). The concept is 
millennial focused as the youth generation is more price sensitive (more 
informed about concurrency and less wealthy) with a tech-driven shop 
experience and also adopting the trend of smaller stores (which already started 
in Europe with Tesco and Carrefour, for example). Furthermore, 365 stores allow 
WFM to explore less affluent markets which would not be profitable through the 
larger and more expensive traditional stores. Thus, the “365 stores” concept is 
vital to keep expanding, avoiding cannibalization and conquering a new segment 
of customers. 
Price investments 
 
WFM still has a huge gross margin compared to its competitors in the retail 
sector (food and beverages) as it can be seen in Figure 11. The chosen group is 
composed by the largest supermarkets and the WFM peer group in order to have 
a better view of the grocery retail industry. The leadership in gross margin is 
mostly explained by its strong brand value and exclusively operating in a 
premium market where competition was not aggressive. However, over the last 
years the conditions in the sector have been changing drastically. The largest 
U.S. players in grocery sector noticed the opportunity and so, they started to 
explore the natural and organic sector by setting lower prices than WFM. This 
had a negative impact in WFM performance and, consequently, the company has 
been reacting through price investments to retain customers (promotion 
campaigns, affinity programs and reduction of some products’ prices). Therefore, 
gross margins have been declining as it is noticeable in Figure 12. Although 
Figure 11: Competitors’ gross margins 
Source: eMarketer Retail 
Figure 10: Whole Foods stores in United 
States (each dot means one store)   
Source: Whole Foods Market 
2016
Walmart 24,6%
Kroger 22,2%
Costco 11,1%
Target 29,1%
Publix 27,3%
Whole Foods Market 34,4%
Sprouts Farmers Market 29,2%
NGVC 28,6%
Ingles Market 24,4%
Weis Markets 27,8%
Median 27,6%
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the price investments strategy is one available for WFM to overcome this tough 
environment, it is not its goal to start an aggressive price war, according its CEO.  
Prepared Foods and Bakery 
 
Prepared foods and bakery are a key differentiator of WFM and in 2016, they 
were responsible for around 19% of the overall sales (around $3 billion), shown 
in Figure 13. It is also one type of product that diversifies WFM business which is 
vital to attract new customers and retain the existent ones and, consequently, to 
overcome the current tough industry conditions. In the future, it is expected to 
relatively increase its weight in company’s overall sales due to e-commerce 
development where customers can order these prepared foods (working as a 
restaurant), and therefore, leverage this product category. 
Online Channel 
 
WFM in a partnership with Instacart launched an online national grocery and 
pick-up service in September 2014. The purpose of this move was to stay ahead 
of its competitors offering its customers an additional sale channel where they 
can choose according to their preferences how they want to buy. The partnership 
started in September 2014 in only two locations and in the end of 2016 the 
number of U.S. stores embedded in the program was around 50%. E-commerce 
is starting to be more and more used by customers. In retail sector, it is expected 
to remain with this upside trend in the next years (Figure 14). Specifically, from 
2013 to 2016, in natural products industry, the e-commerce grew 42,5% from $4 
billion dollars to $5,6 billion, increasing also its share in overall sales, as it can be 
seen in Figure 15. According to a study of 2014, “Nielsen E-commerce and the 
New Retail Survey”, 55% of respondents were willing to order online for delivery 
home and 57% were willing to order online and pick up inside the store (Figure 
16). Although more than half wanted to use these services, only 12% and 9%, 
respectively, were already using them. Furthermore, generation Z (15-20) and 
millennials (21-34) are the most avid online grocery shoppers. Thus, it is 
expected that in the future, e-commerce options experience a huge growth in the 
number of its users. 
Macroeconomic Analysis 
 
Whole Foods Market operates mainly in U.S., having also operations in Canada 
and UK. However, the global economy has impacted the company 
performance due to two main reasons: the entire world is connected, and some 
suppliers are from less developed countries. 
Figure 13: Product category   
(Figures may not sum due to rounding)               
Source: Annual Report 
Figure 12: Gross Margin Evolution 
Source: Annual Report 
Figure 14: E-commerce share of total 
retail sales in US    
Source: Statista 
Figure 15: E-commerce Performance in 
Natural Products Industry    
Source: Natural Foods Merchandiser 
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Figure 17: Macroeconomic Data 
Source: IMF Forecasts 
Based on the World Economic Outlook Database, April 2017, developed by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), regarding the world performance, there 
is an expected GDP growth rate of 3-4% at constant prices between 2017 and 
2022. This growth will not be uniform around the world, being expected advanced 
economies to grow at a slower pace (between 1,6% and 2%) while emerging 
market and developing economies to grow at around 4,5% to 5%. The world 
commodity food and beverage price index is forecasted to have a slight increase 
in 2017 of 2% and after that, it will remain more or less constant until 2022. 
Regarding U.S., according to IMF forecasts, GDP at constant prices will grow 
above 2% in the next 3 years, decreasing to around 1,7% in the following years. 
These numbers are in line with what happened in the previous years. However, 
inflation (average consumer prices) will behave very differently compared to 
previous years. It is expected to be above 2% in the following years which 
represents a huge jump compared to the previous 2 years. The unemployment 
rate is predicted to remain around 4,5-5% in line with 2016 while the population 
is expected to grow. In accordance with the University of Michigan, the 
consumer sentiment, which is an indicator that measures the health of the 
economy, has been increasing since 2012 from 75,0 in January 2012 to 97,1 in 
May 2017 (Units:  Index 1966: Q1=100, Not Seasonally Adjusted). Lastly, in 
order to understand the companies’ health, since the 2008/2009 Financial 
Crisis, the principal U.S. stock index (S&P 500) has been increasing at a high 
pace from 683,8 index points in March 2009 to 2415,8 index points in May 2017. 
Regarding Canada, GDP at constant prices will have a growth rate of 1,8%-2% 
in the following six years which is higher than what was experienced in the last 2 
years. Inflation will also grow from 1,4% in 2016 to 2% in 2017 and then it will 
remain constant in the following years while unemployment rate will go through 
a slow decrease from 7% in 2016 to 6,58% in 2022. 
Lastly, it is more difficult to predict the future of UK due to the uncertainty 
regarding Brexit, voted on the 23th of June 2016. Nevertheless, IMF forecasts 
GDP growth rate to be negatively affected by Brexit mainly in 2018 and 2019, as 
it can be seen in Figure 17. Inflation was almost 0 in 2015 and 0,64% in 2016. 
Besides these low figures in the past, until 2022, it is forecasted to be equal to or 
above 2%. The unemployment rate will be constant around 5%. 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Percentage of people using and 
willing to use E-commerce in Grocery 
Industry     
Source: “Nielsen E-commerce and the New Retail 
Survey”, 2014 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
US 2,224 1,677 2,37 2,596 1,616 2,307 2,519 2,121 1,825 1,672 1,703
Canada 1,746 2,475 2,565 0,942 1,433 1,941 1,956 1,843 1,8 1,8 1,8
UK 1,313 1,911 3,07 2,194 1,806 2,048 1,457 1,606 1,909 1,92 1,917
US 2,073 1,465 1,612 0,12 1,275 2,654 2,381 2,637 2,324 2,18 2,271
Canada 1,53 0,925 1,92 1,132 1,409 1,972 2,098 2,068 2,003 1,999 2,007
UK 2,801 2,568 1,472 0,05 0,642 2,452 2,625 2,244 2,1 2 2
US 8,075 7,367 6,167 5,258 4,85 4,675 4,612 4,439 4,48 4,748 4,993
Canada 7,325 7,1 6,925 6,9 7 6,868 6,753 6,7 6,654 6,616 6,579
UK 7,975 7,575 6,2 5,4 4,9 4,912 5,052 5,2 5,2 5,1 5
US 314,284 316,476 318,789 321,08 323,298 325,741 328,244 330,766 333,307 335,867 338,448
Canada 34,697 35,102 35,496 35,821 36,229 36,694 37,097 37,506 37,918 38,335 38,757
UK 63,705 64,106 64,597 65,11 65,572 66,03 66,487 66,928 67,36 67,781 68,203
GDP growth at 
constant prices
Inflation
Unemployment 
Rate
Population
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Industry Overview 
 
Natural and organic food and beverages have been increasing its share in 
customer’s consumption over the last years since people are increasingly more 
concerned about health and environmental issues. According to Statista, in 2016, 
the health and wellness food sales worldwide were $707,12 billion with 
expectation to keep the uptrend (Figure 18). Regarding the organic food 
market, it accounted to $90 billion also in 2016. U.S., Canada and UK 
accounted for 46%, 4% and 3% of retail sales of organic food, respectively, 
hence representing a few of the main agents of the market.  
Regarding the U.S., the supermarket industry is composed by a large number of 
supermarket chains ranging from international companies to small local stores. 
In 2016, according to the Progressive Grocer, the supermarket industry in food 
and beverages recorded $668,68 billion in sales (Figure 19 – light green bars). 
Although there are many players in the sector, the market share of the top 4, 8 
and 20, as it can be seen in Figure 20, has been increasing over the past 
decades which shows the consolidation of the industry. Regarding the market 
share of the main food and beverage retailers in 2016, Walmart and Kroger 
accounted for 17,3% and 8,9%, respectively, while WFM for 1,7% (Figure 21). 
In the U.S. natural products sector, sales in 2016 yielded $140,9 billion 
(Figure 19 – dark green bars) which were split per distribution channel in Figure 
22. For the $54,4 billion sold by natural products retailers, WFM accounted for 
28,2% being the largest player followed by Trader Joe’s. The share of 
conventional retailers’ sales has been increasing very fast which is one more 
proof that they are entering aggressively in this niche. Regarding organic food, 
in 2016, it accounted for $41,7 billion and it is forecasted to achieve $135,3 billion 
in 2025, according Statista. 
According to specialists in the industry, besides the deflation and price 
investments that have been flooding the sector in U.S. in the last couple years, 
some trends are also appearing which may affect the future of the grocery 
industry: the appearance of e-commerce, shorter trips to the supermarkets 
which means consumers go more times but spend less money, the arising of 
smaller stores, the entrance of new large international players (Aldi and Lidl) 
and the increasingly interest in natural and organic products. 
As referred by Packaged Facts, there are some more important facts about this 
niche market: 1) 36% of consumers seek out for organic food while 42% for 
natural foods and beverages; 2) natural and organic foods and beverages sales 
are forecasted to grow 70% from 2016 to 2021; 3) although consumers continue 
Figure 18: Health and wellness food 
market value worldwide from 2016 to 
2021 (in $ billion)                  
Source: Statista 
Figure 20: Largest 4, 8 and 20 firms' share 
of U.S. grocery sales   
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using 
data from US Census Bureau’s Economic Census 
and Monthly Trade Survey, company annual reports 
and industry sources 
Figure 19: Supermarket performance in U.S. 
Source: Natural Foods Merchandiser 
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to make their decisions according to the traditional value drivers (price, 
convenience and taste), they are also weighing increasingly the following drivers 
in their food purchasing decisions: health and wellness, safety, social impact, 
experience and transparency. The market research publisher, Packaged Foods, 
calls to these new drivers “evolving drivers” since they are expected to have 
even more importance in the future in consumers’ decisions which is a good 
signal for natural and organic food retailers.  
Furthermore, as stated in Allied Market Research Report, from 2017 to 2023, 
China, Canada, Germany, France and U.S. will be the most lucrative markets 
in this niche sector. This conclusion is withdrawn after the evaluation of market 
growth and market attractiveness for a few different countries. 
Porter’s Analysis 
 
In order to have a better perception of industry environment and how WFM fits in 
the sector, a Porter’s Analysis was conducted.  
Competitive rivalry or competition is getting more intense due to the entrance 
of large supermarket chains in the niche market which practice lower prices. This 
is the consequence of the increased demand for these products (people are 
increasingly aware about health issues, food quality and its origin). Thus, 
competitive rivalry has been having a strong negative influence on the 
performance of Whole Foods Market over the last couple of years. In order to 
minimize this negative effect of competition, WFM created the 365 stores, a 
concept with lower prices that was already explained, it started to offer e-
commerce and last but not least, it increased the advertisement and marketing 
investments to show people the high quality of its products and also to maximize 
category management.  
The bargaining power of customers is stronger thanks to an increase in the 
number of companies offering this type of products which now gives much more 
choice to consumers. Besides, the websites and companies’ apps allow 
customers to compare products and prices easily and faster which also increases 
their bargaining power. Lastly, the high price sensitivity of a significative share of 
natural and organic products’ customers, youth people, turns price into an even 
more vital factor. WFM reacted through price investments, promotion campaigns 
and an enhanced loyalty program to minimize the consequence of this force. 
The bargaining power of suppliers is moderate for WFM. On one hand, the 
company has many different suppliers and this allows WFM to always have a 
second choice with low switching costs. On the other hand, one of the 
suppliers accounted for 32,5% of the total purchases in fiscal year 2016 meaning 
Figure 22: 2016 Market Overview for 
natural products industry   
Source: Natural Foods Merchandiser 
Figure 21: U.S. sales of top food and 
beverages retailers in 2016    
Source: Cowen and Company 
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that operating results would be affected if something happened between WFM 
and United Natural Foods, Inc (UNFI). Furthermore, the high requirements 
about quality and the no use of some non-natural products restricts the 
number of suppliers available which increases bargaining power of the ones 
that fill these requirements. 
The threat of substitute products is moderate since although “traditional” 
products have much lower prices and similar characteristics, the raising concern 
about environment and health issues makes the consumption of these type of 
products a priority for some customers and so, product differentiation is very 
high for them.  
The threat of new entrants is very high in grocery retail industry since there are 
almost no barriers to entry (no patents nor specialized labour force) neither 
high capital requirements as it happens in another sectors. Thus, with the ease 
of opening a supermarket, the odds that more players keep entering in the niche 
market are high. 
Competition & Peer Group 
 
For the competitors’ group, all the supermarket chains which sell natural and 
rganic products were considered. Thus, Wal-Mart (WMT), Publix and Costco 
(COST) represent the national superstores that have been increasing natural 
and organic foods offerings while Kroger (KR), Supervalu and Safeway 
(subsidiary of Albertsons) represent the national conventional supermarkets 
that are also increasing the share of organic products. Besides these companies, 
for the alternative food retailers’ group (where Whole Foods Market is 
included), the following were considered: Sprouts Farmers Market (SFM), 
Vitamin Cottage Natural Grocers (NGVC), Trader Joe’s, The Fresh Market, 
Smart & Final, Ingles Markets (IMKTA) and Weis Markets (WMK). Moreover, 
there are much more regional and local conventional stores which compete with 
the retailers mentioned above. However, neither all of them are considered to 
belong to the same peer group as WFM. Thus, the most similar to WFM are 
Trader Joe’s, Sprouts Farmers Market (SFM) and The Fresh Market because 
they have the U.S. as the main market, they are big enough to be organized like 
WFM, operate exclusively in the niche market (natural and organic products) and 
also have high margins. However, for multiple valuation, it will only be considered 
SFM (tier 1) since the other ones are not public companies. Besides this 
company, others (tier 2) which are similar (but not so much as the previous) were 
considered. Three more companies were added: NGVC, Ingles Markets and 
Weis Markets. These supermarkets chains are in tier 2 since they fail one of the 
criteria above. In NGVC, the revenues amounts are very different while for the 
Figure 23: Peer group share performance 
Source: Reuters 
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Figure 24: Peer Group              
Source: eMarketerRetail 
Revenues ($m) Gross Margins EBITDA EBITDA margin US stores Average store size (sq ft) ROIC (not adjusted)
Whole Foods Market 15724,0 34,4% 1355,0 8,6% 434 39000 12,70%
Sprouts Farmers Market 4064,4 29,2% 293,3 7,2% 253 27900 12,30%
Vitamin Cottage Natural Grocers 705,5 28,6% 45,9 6,5% 123 16100 8,20%
Ingles Markets 3795,0 24,4% 238,0 6,3% 201 55300 6,30%
Weis Markets 3136,7 27,8% 175,0 5,6% 204 47900 9,10%
other two the trouble is that selling natural and organic products is not their main 
activity although they have an important line of such products. The description 
about each company is in Appendix. Nevertheless, they are similar enough to 
compare them (Figure 24) and so, it is useful to compute an EV using all of them. 
Forecasts 
 
Revenues 
 
In order to forecast the revenues of WFM, sales were split by channel (physical 
stores and e-commerce). Physical stores were divided by geography (US, 
Canada and UK) and U.S. physically stores which were additionally broken down 
into traditional stores and the new concept stores (365). For brick-and-mortar 
stores, the three key drivers are the number of stores, square feet (sq ft) per 
store and the sales per sq ft while for online sales, revenues were separated in 
number of stores and the performance per store. The share of each channel 
in end of the fiscal year of 2016 can be seen in Figure 25 which includes some 
assumptions since the annual report does not have specific information about 
365 stores and online sales revenues neither the split between Canada and UK.   
Furthermore, the following assumptions were made: 1) in the past, the size per 
traditional store was the same in the three countries; 2) a new store has a 
performance of 50% because since as it is not known when it was opened, it was 
assumed that, on average, they are opened in the middle of the year; and 3) 
relocated stores have a performance of 75%, assuming it takes 3 months since it 
is closed one store until it is reopened. It is important to notice that WFM ST and 
MT forecasts were not done neither based on correlations between its 
performance and macroeconomic evolution nor industry data of the past because 
the industry has been experiencing a new environment and so, using only 
correlations with past information would lead to wrong forecasts. 
U.S. (Traditional Stores) 
 
For the United States, it is noticeable the deterioration of sales per sq ft in the 
last couple of years (Figure 26) which was counterbalanced with the opening of 
new stores, yielding positive revenues’ growth rates. For the future, it was 
assumed the number of new stores opened each year will decrease as CEO 
John Mackey mentioned it in an interview. Until 2021 the forecasts for stores 
Figure 25: Revenues per channel in 2016 
Source: Company data, Analyst assumptions & 
Newspapers’ news 
Revenues ($M) Share per channel
Us traditional stores 15101,81 96,0%
US 365 stores 30,2 0,2%
Canada 343,93 2,2%
UK 108,01 0,7%
Online Sales 140,09 0,9%
Total Sales 15724,00 100,0%
Figure 26: Sales per sq ft evolution of U.S. 
Traditional Stores    
Source: Analyst assumptions 
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were based on the Annual Report, which mentions that 79 new traditional stores 
will be opened of which 18 stores are reallocations. Thus, the analyst forecasted 
that WFM will open 52 new traditional stores in U.S. until 2021, but at a 
decreasing pace (Figure 27). Afterwards, the number of new stores opened per 
year will converge to 5 per year. This number is in line with WFM goals of 
keeping opening new stores but in a more selective and conservative way. Yet, 
as more stores are opened, the difficulty to find good places for the expansion 
increases. Regarding the size of each store, it was considered to converge for 
the size expected for 2021, according to Annual Report 2016. After that, the size 
was presumed to be constant. Finally, the sales per sq ft is the main driver of 
revenues and the most affected in the recent past. As it was mentioned above, 
WFM is trying to overcome the tough environment in the industry through 
promotions campaigns, price investments, improving its loyalty programs and 
higher marketing & advertising expenses. Even though these measures have 
been undertaken, it is expected that it takes some time for them to succeed. In 
the short run, the deflation environment, lower gross margins and the loss of 
some customers are expected to be stronger forces than the positive effects 
coming from the measures stated above, thus inducing a continued downward 
trend in sales per sq ft until 2018 (Figure 25). After 2019, it is expected sales per 
sq ft to tend to the inflation rate, reaching its value in 2021. After that, it will keep 
growing at the inflation rate. Therefore, the higher demand for these products in 
the future was forecasted to be mainly fulfilled by the entry of new players and/or 
traditional players (as Walmart and Kroger) and by the new concepts. This 
means WFM is expected to grow at a rate lower than the market and, 
consequently, to lose market share. In the next 5 years, revenues from U.S. 
traditional stores will increase at a CAGR of 3,6% (Figure 28). 
365 Stores 
 
“365 Stores” is a new concept created in 2015 and thus there is no official 
information about their performance in the 2016 Annual Report. Therefore, 
having in consideration the average size of its stores, the prices charged and the 
market segment, it was considered its performance (sales per sq ft) would be 
similar to Sprouts Farmers Market (SFM) stores. However, as WFM brand is 
stronger than Sprouts Market, it was considered 365 stores will have sales per sq 
ft slightly higher than SFM. Following all these assumptions, a value of $657,61 
was found for sale per sq ft in 2016 (Figure 29). For the future, it was forecasted 
a growth rate equal to the inflation rate plus a premium of 0,5% due to the 
expectation of a successful implementation because besides its lower prices, 365 
stores have embedded future trends: smaller and more technological stores. It is 
important to highlight that for 2017, the inflation rate considered for food and 
SFM 365 Stores
Sales per sq ft 
(old store)
616,15$        677,76$       
Sales per sq ft 
(new store)
308,07$        338,88$       
Figure 29: 365 stores Performance vs SFM 
Performance    
Source: Analyst assumptions 
Figure 27: Number of new U.S. Traditional 
Stores     
Source: Analyst & Company estimations 
Figure 28: Revenues from U.S. Traditional 
Stores ($M)        
Source: Analyst estimations 
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beverages was lower than the overall country’s inflation because of the deflation 
environment in the sector as it was referred above. The number of stores 
opened in the following years (until 2021) and the average size of each store 
were based on the information given in Annual Report 2016. For perpetuity, it is 
assumed sales per sq ft will keep growing at a premium of 0,5% above inflation 
rate and the opening of 4 new stores per year. For the size per store, it will be the 
same as in 2021. Through all these assumptions, in the next 5 years, 365 stores 
will grow a lot, turning itself as one of the main drivers for the supermarket chain 
(Figure 30). 
UK 
 
WFM performance in the UK has been very poor comparing to North America 
countries. UK revenues represent only 1% of total revenues (Figure 31). 
Consequently, there are experts stating WFM may close or sell its UK stores. As 
UK share in overall revenues is residual, the number of stores was not affected 
by these predictions and was assumed to be the same. Lastly, according to the 
Rabobank report “Organic is good for you!” from 2016, organic food sales will 
grow in the base scenario at a CAGR of 6,7% from 2016 until 2025 in Western 
Europe. However, due to the unpredictability of UK future caused by Brexit and 
its worse performance compared to other Western Europe countries, it is 
reasonable to be sceptic about the 6,7% growth for UK, considering better to 
assume a discount of 3% in order to have more conservative and realistic 
assumptions for the uncertainty of UK future. In 2018 and 2019, sales per sq ft 
will grow at the inflation rate since the Brexit consequences in the UK Economy 
are not clear yet. Since 2022 onwards, it is considered it will tend to inflation rate 
plus a premium of 0,5%. This premium is explained by mainly two reasons: 1) 
there is no possibility for cannibalization due to low number of WFM stores; 2) it 
is a sector of the future and although more players will explore it, it is reasonable 
to expect WFM will also absorb a share of the growing demand of the future. 
Canada 
 
Canada operations have a share of around 2% in the overall WFM sales. For 
the future, it is considered the size of the stores will go hand-in-hand with 
U.S. stores. Regarding the expansion in number of stores, in 2013, the LT goal 
for Canada was 40 but with no timeline. However, nowadays this number is too 
optimistic because Canada does not have a lot of cities with a size considerably 
enough to be profitable to open so many WFM stores since there are already 
other companies exploring the niche market. Consequently, it was considered LT 
goal for Canada will not be achieved, lowering the value for 25 stores. For 
simplicity, it was considered sales per sq ft will grow at a small premium 
Figure 30: 365 stores' performance     
Source: Analyst & Company estimations 
Figure 32: Canada Natural Food & Drinks 
Market, 2016-2023 ($ Million)  
Source: Allied Market Research 
Figure 31: Revenues from UK Stores ($M) 
Source: Analyst estimations 
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compared to inflation rate because there is no risk of cannibalization effect (low 
number of stores) and also because according to Allied Market Research Report, 
Canada will be one of the most lucrative countries to invest in this niche. Figure 
32 shows that Canada’s natural industry will grow substantially in the next 6 
years as well as WFM’s division in Canada (Figure 33), keeping constant the 
market share in Canada. Regarding 2017, according to a specialist, Canada’s 
businesses have been hurting due to the drop of oil prices over the last years. 
Consequently, in 2017, it is assumed the growth rate of sales per sq ft will be 0 
since oil prices on 31st of May were in line with past prices. 
Online Channel 
 
The WFM e-commerce still has a long path ahead and there is no specific data 
about its evolution in any Annual Report. According to the co-CEO Walter Robb, 
on February 2015, the weekly online delivery sales were around $1 million. 
As the e-commerce operated at that time in 15 cities which had on total 85 
stores, it was considered in that year, those stores would make $52 million. The 
average per store is assumed to be constant. In 2016, the number of stores 
with e-commerce were 50% of U.S. stores, as stated by the company. For the 
future, it is assumed the program will be expanded to around 90% of the stores 
and not 100% since there are stores which are so close to others that would not 
make sense to have this service. 
The forecast of e-commerce growth rate will be based on the market expectation 
due to lack of official information from WFM. According to FMI-Nielson Report, 
the online grocery spending will grow at a CAGR between 9% (most 
conservative) to 20% (most optimistic) during 2016-2025. Since the 2013-2016 
compound growth rate in natural products e-commerce in U.S. lies in that range 
(12,5%), it is assumed this value for the forecasted period. In perpetuity, it is 
assumed to grow at a higher rate than inflation due to the expectation that future 
generations will be more likely to use the service and so, it will keep expanding.  
Regarding the prices, WFM set the products to be sold at the same as in 
traditional stores and customers pay an extra fee to Instacart that depends on the 
location and also the frequency. About costs, although the company saves in 
labour costs, there is the need to invest on IT to have good platforms (website 
and app) which allow customers to have a good shopping experience. 
Gross Margin 
 
As it was referred above, market conditions are not favourable to keep constant 
gross margins in the future. Deflation environment, price investments and the 
entrance of new discounters (Aldi and Lidl) have been narrowing margins. As it 
Figure 33: Revenues from Canada Stores 
($M)                 
Source: Analyst estimations 
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was stated by the company, WFM will continue with price investments in the 
future, and, consequently, it is expected that margins will decrease even more 
(Figure 34). However, margins are not expected to converge to the industry 
average as WFM has a premium brand in which customers pay more due to its 
higher quality and reliability. Moreover, CEO Mackey’s view for WFM highlights 
this position, “Promotions and price investments are an integral part of our 
conversation, but we are not participating in a race to the bottom.”. Thus, 
margins will decrease in the next 3 years and then will remain constant, 
assuming industry will be more stable and price war has already finished.  
Regarding 365 stores, due to the absence of information and their similarity to 
SFM, it was assumed their margins to be the same as SFM average gross 
margins of the last 2 years. This is expected to remain constant in the future 
since 365 stores have lower prices than traditional stores and it was considered 
WFM will not do extra promotion campaigns in these stores. Furthermore, 365 
stores were created in these current conditions and so, it is believed its margins 
will remain constant. 
Costs 
 
In a competitive environment where margins have been affected, in order to 
survive, WFM’s CEO John Mackey said in March 2016 “our strategy is to 
adjust our operating model to a lower margin and lower cost structure,” 
(Figure 35). Summarizing, investments made in technology, in marketing and in 
pricing are expected to be offset by a lowering cost structure with labour 
restructuring and with a hybrid purchasing structure instead of a decentralized 
one as it is currently implemented. 
Labour Costs 
 
Regarding labour costs, there are no specific numbers mentioned in past Annual 
Reports. However, in 2013, the WFM’s CEO declared that the average hourly 
wage of WFM was $18,89, a value that is above the industry average. This is 
reasonable because it is supposed that WFM employees offer a premium support 
to its customers. In order to convert this value to 2016, it was assumed WFM 
employees’ nominal wage grew at the same pace as private companies’ salaries 
in U.S. during the same period. Thus, considering the assumption referred 
above, the average hourly wage in 2016 was $20,20, using growth rates based 
on Bureau of Labor Statistics. Another assumption was that part-time employees 
work, on average, 20 hours per week. With all this information, WFM spent 
around $3,1 billion in 2016 in wages which corresponds to 19,6% of revenues. As 
it can be seen in Figure 36, the number of employees per sq ft is much higher 
in WFM than in other companies. Thus, and also because cost structure is 
Figure 34: Overall WFM's Gross Margin 
Source: Analyst assumptions 
Employees per store Employees per sq ft
WFM 190,8 0,00489
SFM 106,7 0,00383
NGVC 24,4 0,00152
Ingles Markets 131,8 0,00238
Smart & Final Stores 39,2 0,00165
Weis Markets 112,7 0,00235
Figure 36: Peers' ratios regarding 
employees     
Source: eMarketer Retail 
Figure 35: SG&A, Pre-opening and 
Relocations expenses as % of Revenues 
Source: Analyst assumptions 
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expected to decrease according to the Board of Directors, it is assumed 
employees per sq ft will continue to decrease to numbers closer to SFM. 
This phenomenon is counterbalanced by more technological stores. However, 
the ratio in WFM traditional stores will continue to be higher than SFM because 
as already mentioned, a premium store demands more employees per customer 
for a better and faster service. Thus, in the next three years, WFM ratio will 
converge to 110% of current SFM ratio, stabilizing the ratio from 2019 onwards 
(Figure 37). The average hour paid will be updated indexed to inflation. 
Regarding 365 stores, it was assumed the average of employees per sq ft will 
be the same as the first 365 store opened in Silver Lake and it will remain 
constant in the future. This assumption was made since when the concept was 
created, this competitive environment was already present in the grocery sector. 
Thus, 365 stores will have a slightly lower ratio than in traditional stores which is 
offset by more technological stores and less personal support by employees. 
Marketing & Advertising 
 
The marketing and advertising were far from a priority to WFM since its inception. 
However, times have changed as well as the atmosphere in natural and organic 
grocery industry. The huge increase in competition has been affecting WFM 
negatively and so, the company felt the need to react in order to keep pushing 
the brand value and to increase loyalty from its customers, as mentioned above.  
One of the measures taken by the company was to invest in advertising, 
launching its first TV ad ever in 2015 (“Values Matter”) and the second in the 
beginning of 2017 in line of what CEO John Mackey said, “We can lower prices 
here and there, but if people don’t know about them, we won’t get the full 
lift.”. This way WFM has added the advertising to the word-of-mouth as the 
two main channels to show why is worth to buy there in order to boost its sales. 
In 2016, WFM spent 0,61% of revenues in advertising expenses which were the 
same as the median of its peer group (Figure 38). Thus, it is assumed that WFM 
will keep with this strategy and, consequently, the ratio will remain constant. As 
Bill Kirk, an analyst for RBC Capital Markets, said, “We believe this is a positive 
development that suggests Whole Foods' 2016 pursued strategies have reached 
a point where it's time to communicate the company's progress.” 
Regarding marketing, the investments were made more in data about 
customers, their preferences (personalization) and also category 
management. Thus, as gathering customer data is increasingly more important 
and WFM declared one of the main ways to overcome these difficult times would 
be retaining its best customers, it was assumed next year marketing expenses as 
percentage of revenues will raise to 0,25% and then the ratio will keep constant. 
Figure 38: Peers' Advertising expenses as 
% of Revenues     
Source: eMarketer Retail 
Figure 37: Labour evolution of WFM  
Source: Analyst estimations 
2016
WFM 0,61%
SFM 0,90%
Natural Grocers 1,50%
Ingles Markets 0,40%
Weis Markets 0,30%
Median 0,61%
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Net Working capital 
 
Net working capital includes the following captions: Operating Cash, 
Restricted Cash, Accounts Receivable, Inventories and Prepaid expenses and 
Other Current Assets in operating assets and Accounts Payable, Accrued payroll, 
bonus and benefits due team members and Other Current Liabilities in operating 
liabilities. 
Regarding Operating cash, it was considered to be 2% of revenues since, 
according to bibliography, it is the amount necessary, on average, to manage 
current operations regarding the core of the company. Prepaid expenses and 
other current assets is a residual caption that was volatile in the past. Thus, it 
was considered the same percentage of revenues occurred in 2016 (1,06%). 
Additionally, for Restricted Cash caption, as it is associated to the workers’ 
compensation obligations, the driver chosen to forecast was the number of 
workers. The ratio of restricted cash to number of workers was constant over the 
last 2 years and, consequently, it was assumed in the future it will keep constant 
at 0,14%. From 2020 onwards, it was assumed the ratio will be constant as 
percentage of revenues. 
For the operating liabilities, the caption Other Current Liabilities is composed 
by quite different components and it has been volatile over the past 4 years 
which makes it harder to forecast. Thus, it was considered the average 
percentage of revenues of those years and assumed it will remain constant in the 
future. For the Accrued payroll, bonus and benefits due team members, it 
was forecasted through two drivers: number of workers and the following ratio 
(expenses with this caption as percentage of workers). For the future, it was 
assumed the ratio will be constant and equal to the average of the last 4 years. 
Then, it is multiplied by the number of workers of each year.  
For the accounts receivable, inventories and accounts payable, it was used data 
about the peer group in order to have a better perception on how these captions 
will evolve in the future. Regarding Accounts Receivable, it was computed as 
percentage of revenues. The median of peer group is equal to WFM value for 
2016 (Figure 39) and, consequently, it is assumed the ratio will keep constant in 
the future with the same value as in 2016. 
Regarding Inventories, it was considered as percentage of costs of goods sold 
(COGS) instead of revenues to take the effect of different margins among the 
peer group. WFM has a more efficient inventory policy comparing to its peers 
as it can be seen in Figure 40. Thus, it is assumed WFM will stick with its policy 
since there is no information against this assumption.  
Figure 39: Accounts Receivables as % 
of Revenues of Peer Group   
Source: eMarketerRetail 
Figure 40: Inventories as % of COGS of 
Peer Group              
Source: eMarketerRetail 
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Lastly, regarding Accounts Payable, it is much lower than the peers’ value 
(Figure 41). This can be explained by two main reasons: the lower inventory 
amount as percentage of revenues and a large number of suppliers which means 
lower amounts owed to each one and, consequently, a paid speedily. For the 
future, it is assumed this value will increase slightly due to the evolution for a 
hybrid centralized purchasing, but it will remain far from peer group’s median. 
Concluding, in the next years, the cash flow from NWC variations will be 
favourable which shows the expected efficiency improvements WFM will take in 
order to overcome current conditions. The ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities fluctuated between 0,99 and 1,20 over the last four years. In 
perpetuity, this ratio will converge to 1,12 which is slightly lower than market 
standard but in line with WFM past values. 
CAPEX and Capitalized Operating Leases 
 
 
CAPEX 
 
The WFM’s Capex is computed through the difference of PPE plus depreciations. 
Regarding the PPE, it corresponds to the average of the last 4 years of PPE per 
sq ft adjusted by inflation times the forecasted total square footage. The increase 
in PPE is expected to happen at a lower rate in the future since WFM will be 
more selective choosing the new stores and, consequently, will expand at a 
slower pace. This is clear after analysing expansion capex as percentage of 
revenues. While in the last 3 years the average of this ratio was 3,6%, in the 
future, it will have its maximum in 2018 (2,8%) and will converge for 1,4% in 
perpetuity. As it can be seen in Figure 42, the expansion CAPEX will be 
decreasing its share in overall CAPEX which is in accordance with a slower 
WFM’s expansion (opening less stores per year, on average, than in the past). 
Regarding depreciations, in the future, it is assumed to have the ratio 
depreciations as percentage of PPE constant and equal to the average of the last 
4 years. In supermarket chains, operating leases are used in different quantities 
among the companies and so, it does not make sense to compare the Capex as 
percentage of revenues with other corporations since the comparison would be 
biased. For the long-term, beyond 2023, it was considered PPE as percentage 
of revenues to be equal to the 2022 value. 
Operating Leases 
 
WFM has a significant number of operating leases which is an off-balance sheet 
caption. Although the reformulation of these leases does not affect the equity 
value of the company, it affects the EV, ROIC and unlevered free cash flows. 
As it is stated in Mckinsey book, “Adjusting the financial statement makes 
Figure 42: Capex ($M)   
Source: Analyst estimations 
Figure 41: Accounts Payable as % of COGS 
of Peer Group                  
Source: eMarketerRetail 
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return on capital and free cash flow once again independent of capital 
structure choices, specifically whether to lease, own, or borrow”, having a 
better idea of the company’s core performance. In order to compute the 
capitalized operating leases, the formula below was used (Figure 43), taking past 
rental expenses from Annual Reports and forecasting future rents. The cost of 
debt considered was AA-rated yields (lower risk than the company because it is 
associated to a physical collateral). Lastly, to estimate the asset life, the 
methodology proposed by Lim, Mann and Mihov of dividing PPE by annual 
depreciation was used. Afterwards, to include these assets in the balance sheet, 
they were added to operating assets and financial debt. At last but not least, 
according to “Lim, Mann and Mihov” and “Ohio State University”, one more 
reason to readjust capitalized operating leases is the fact that rating agencies 
take into account these operations to evaluate the company’s rating. 
ROIC Analysis 
 
It is important to analyse the Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) of WFM and 
compare it with the closest peer and a proxy for the industry in order to 
understand how good it is WFM at turning capital into profits relatively to its 
sector. The comparison will be made considering ROIC adjusted for operating 
leases since the purpose is to conclude about the performance of the core 
business regardless of the financial structure. WFM’s ROIC decreased heavily 
in the last year but it is not an isolated case as the Figure 44 shows. The tough 
environment in the industry affected negatively also the closest peer and the 
industry retail (grocery and food) given by Damodaran database. It is important to 
highlight that WFM might have been more affected than SFM because of its 
higher prices. 
Regarding the forecast period, in the short-term, it is expected the RONIC to be 
negative, affecting the overall ROIC. However, RONIC will increase after 2018 
because it is expected the stabilization of the industry which will allow the 
company to profit from the invested capital. After that, from 2024 onwards, 
RONIC will stabilize around 9,0-9,5% which is reasonable since it is a value 
higher than WACC and lower than ROIC. The comparison with WACC allows 
to conclude that the company will be continuously creating value since RONIC is 
always higher than WACC from 2018 onwards. Lastly, the reinvestment rate will 
be lower in the future due to the current WFM strategy of being more selective in 
the opening of new stores. The evolution of the respective ratios in the next years 
is presented in Figure 45. 
Figure 44: ROIC evolution of WFM, SFM 
and the grocery industry   
Source: Annual Reports & Damodaran Database 
Figure 43: To compute the asset value 
correspondent to a rental expense       
Source: “Valuation – Measuring and Managing the 
Value of Companies” from McKinsey & Company 
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Valuation 
 
DCF 
 
In order to use the DCF methodology to discount the cash flows to find the 
enterprise value and, consequently, the equity value, the WACC had to be 
figured. The risk-free assumed in the computations was the YTM of 10-year U.S. 
government bonds in 31st of May 2017 and it is assumed it will remain constant 
in the future. For the tax rate, it was assumed the federal income tax of 35% plus 
the average of the state income tax rate of last 4 years and also assumed it will 
keep constant in the future. Regarding the market risk premium, as it was 
recommended, it was taken from bibliography. In this specific case, it was 
considered 5,69% based on Damodaran database (Figure 46) which was 
computed with the returns of the last 5 years of the S&P 500. 
The cost of debt of the company will be a weighted average of the two type of 
debts that WFM incorporates (normal financial debt and capitalized operating 
leases), as stated in Figure 47. First of all, it was computed the cost of debt for 
the normal debt, taking the YTM of the senior notes issued on December 2015 
with maturity on December 2025. After, the YTM was converted to the cost of 
debt (3,98%) which has embedded a beta debt of 0,36. For the capitalized 
operating leases, as it says in Mckinsey book, “The secured cost of debt can be 
proxied by the yield to maturity on AA-rated 10-year bonds”. Consequently, with 
the same approach as before, taking the YTM from US Corporate AA Effective 
Yield, a cost of debt for capitalized operating leases of 2,41% was found. 
Regarding the cost of equity, two approaches were used. One of them is based 
on statistical linear regression of historical stock returns’ sensitivity to market risk 
while the other is based on the median of the unlevered beta of the peer group 
which is then relevered for the WFM capital structure.  
For the first methodology (Figure 48), WFM’s weekly returns for the last two 
years were regressed on the S&P 500’s weekly returns (a proxy for the market 
since WFM shareholders are mostly U.S. investors that care only about U.S. 
market). Thus, the slope taken from the regression is the WFM’s beta, according 
to CAPM theory. After, it was adjusted according to forward-looking methodology 
Figure 45: WFM Performance according key financial indicators                   
Source: Analyst estimations 
2015 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F
ROIC 10,3% 8,8% 8,0% 8,0% 8,8% 9,1% 9,5% 9,8% 9,9% 9,8%
RR 73,2% 85,0% 62,2% 79,2% 54,0% 53,5% 37,1% 37,7% 42,4% 41,7%
RONIC 0,5% -11,7% -2,1% 7,9% 21,3% 15,3% 17,6% 19,4% 10,9% 9,5%
g 0,6% -8,6% -1,8% 4,9% 16,9% 8,3% 9,4% 7,2% 4,1% 4,0%
WACC 6,0% 6,0% 6,1% 6,1% 6,1% 6,2% 6,2% 6,2% 6,3% 6,3%
Figure 46: DCF inputs   
Source: Analyst assumptions 
Figure 48: 1st Methodology's Forward-
looking unlevered beta   
Source: Analyst estimations 
Unlevering
Shares outstanding 320250000
Share Price 34,99$                        
Net Debt 635 480 000,00$         
EV 11 841 027 500,00$     
Market Cap. 11 205 547 500,00$     
Operating Leases 
YTM 2,60%
Annualized PD 0,05%
Recovery Rate 62,5%
Rd 2,41%
Bd 0,04
Normal Debt
YTM 4,21%
Annualized PD 0,46%
Recovery Rate 49,50%
Rd 3,98%
Bd 0,36
Beta of equity 0,62Figure 47: Data to Unlevered Beta of Equity 
Source: Analyst assumptions & Bloomberg 
Risk-free 2,21%
Market risk premium 5,69%
Tax rate 39,84%
Adjusted Raw Beta (Be) 0,75
Re 6,46%
Bu 0,72
Ru 6,33%
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(a practice used by Bloomberg). Lastly, it was unlevered the adjusted beta, 
yielding an unlevered beta of 0,72.  
The second methodology (Figure 49) assumes the median of the unlevered 
beta of the peer group is the best proxy for the unlevered beta of that industry. 
The time range to compute peer group’s equity betas was the same as the one 
used for WFM and the proxy for the market was also the same. Afterwards, they 
were adjusted for forward-looking methodology and, subsequently, they were 
unlevered. Thus, the unlevered beta for the industry is 0,76.  
The most trustworthy methodology is assumed to be the 2nd Methodology for this 
case since the R2 (7,18%) for the WFM equity beta is very low and its confidence 
interval is wide which increases the error for the 1st DCF methodology. Thus, 
although the two processes are going to be taken into account, from now on, 
sensitivity and scenario analysis will be presented only for the 2nd Methodology 
as well as the implied share price presented in the first page of the Report. 
Considering the unlevered beta, risk-free, tax rate, and the beta of both types of 
debt constant in the future, the WACC could finally be discovered for every 
year since the capital structure is not constant in the future. For the long-term 
growth rate, the model with all the assumptions above yields a long-term growth 
rate of 3,15% through the product of RONIC and RR. This can be split by inflation 
rate of 2% (long-term goal for the inflation rate of the three countries where WFM 
is present) and the real growth of 1,13% (Figure 50). The real growth rate comes 
essential from the opening of new stores, the good performance of 365 stores, 
UK and Canada stores and online channel. The value is reasonable since it is 
higher than inflation rate which means the company will grow every year in real 
terms but lower than GDP real growth rate. Thus, the 1st and the 2nd DCF 
methodology yielded $33,28 and $30,21 for the implied share price, 
respectively. It is important to highlight that 55% of WFM’s value is in perpetuity. 
Multiple Valuation 
 
 
In order to have a more robust valuation of WFM, other valuation methodologies 
besides DCF were performed which allow the public to have a broader 
perspective of the company’s valuation. Thus, using some peers’ multiples and 
precedent transactions, it was computed the enterprise value for WFM. 
Industry Peers 
The ratios used were based on market values to understand how investors look 
at companies in this sector. Thus, P/E and EV/EBITDA were taken from 
Bloomberg for WFM’s peer group and the median was computed as it can be 
seen in Figure 51. This methodology yielded a range for the company’s 
Figure 51: Peers' Multiples Valuation    
(EV, Net Debt and Equity Value are in $M)  
Source: Bloomberg 
Figure 49: 2nd Methodology's Forward-
looking unlevered beta   
Source: Analyst estimations 
Average GDP nominal growth rate 3,74%
Average GDP real growth rate 1,71%
Average inflation 2,00%
LT nominal growth rate 3,15%
LT real growth rate 1,13%
Peer Group Beta unlevered
WFM 0,72
SFM 1,04
Natural Grocers 0,63
Ingles Markets 0,76
Weis Markets 1,00
Median 0,76
Figure 50: Long-term growth rate split by 
inflation and real growth   
source: Analyst estimations 
P/E Ratio EV/EBITDA
WFM 24,08 7,95
SFM 26,82 12,22
NGVC 25,41 6,44
Ingles Markets 18,67 7,58
Weis Markets 24,83 9,51
Median 25,12 8,55
EV 10 829,08$ 
Net Debt 635,48$      
Equity Value 10 193,60$ 
Share price 32,40$     31,83$         
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value between $31,83 and $32,40. Although it would make sense to present a 
ratio where sales were included since it is one of the most important ratios for 
supermarkets chains' valuation, in this particular case, this would mislead the 
correct valuation of WFM because WFM's margins are the largest in the peer 
group by a significant amount. 
Comparable Transactions 
Lastly, the EV was also computed based on historical transactions. In order to 
choose which deals were related to WFM, four parameters were used: 
companies operating mainly in U.S. market; grocery (food and beverages) 
sector’s transactions; total transaction value higher than $500 million; and 
transactions within a time span of 4 years. Having in consideration these four 
requirements, five transactions were selected (Figure 52). Consequently, and 
using the WFM’s EBITDA and EBIT taken from Bloomberg for the second quarter 
(Q2) of 2017 in order to have the most recent information as possible, it was 
calculated the EV and, consequently, equity value for WFM, shown in Figure 53. 
With this methodology of past deals comparison, the value of the company 
ranges from $26,9 to $27,9. 
 
 
 
 
Summary of Different Equity Values 
Summarising, the outcome of the six methodologies is presented in Figure 54. 
Based on them, the range for WFM’s share price is between $26,90 and 
$33,38. The median and the average of the six methodologies are $31,02 and 
$30,44, respectively. However, based on the trustworthy model (2nd DCF 
methodology), WFM’s share price is $30,21 which means is overvalued by 
13,7%. This value as well as the median and average of the six methodologies 
are in line with WFM’s share price of March and April, before Jana Partners 
acquired 8,2% of WFM. Therefore, the analyst concluded current stock price is 
due to the speculation of a future WFM acquisition and not due to the 
intrinsic value of its business. 
Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis 
 
The grocery industry is experiencing an unstable atmosphere and so, it is difficult 
to predict when and how it will stabilize. Thus, the most significant variables will 
Figure 54: Summary of implied share price 
for each valuation methodology  
Source: Analyst estimations 
TV/EBITDA TV/EBIT
Median 7,3 12,4
EV 9251,29 9570,092
Net Debt 635,48 635,48
Equity 8615,81 8934,612
Price per share 26,90$         27,90$         
Figure 53: Relative Valuation - Comparable 
Transactions    
Source: Analyst estimations 
Implied Share Price
DCF
1st Methodology 33,38$                   
2nd Methodoly 30,21$                   
Industry Peers
P/E Ratio 32,40$                   
EV/EBITDA 31,83$                   
Comparable Transactions
TV/EBITDA 26,90$                   
TV/EBIT 27,90$                   
Figure 52: Comparable Transactions        
Source: Bloomberg and Duff &Phelps’ Report 
Announce Date Acquirer Name Target Name TV ($M) TV/EBITDA TV/EBIT
16/10/2016 Onex Corporation Save-a-Lot Inc 1365,0 7,7 12,2
14/03/2016 Apollo The Fresh Market 1334,4 7,5 12,3
10/11/2015 Kroger Roundy's 784,9 6,9 17,1
06/03/2014 Albertsons Safeway 7903,6 5,0 12,4
08/07/2013 Kroger Harris Teeter Supermarkets 2460,9 7,3 17,1
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be subject to a sensitivity and scenario analysis in order to have a more tough 
valuation and an idea of how the share price will evolve if some previous 
assumptions are breached. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
For the sensitivity analysis, three variables and their effect in the share price 
were assessed. First, it was done the sensitivity for the long-term growth rate 
that has embedded an implicit RONIC and RR and for the unlevered beta. For 
the unlevered beta, it was taken and added 0,1 two times while the LT growth 
rate value was ranged between the inflation rate (2%) and the weighted average 
of nominal GDP in three countries (3,74%), assuming their GDP growth rate in 
perpetuity will be in line with values for 2022 (Figure 17). The impact in share 
price can be seen in Figure 55. The values in red are the ones lower than the 
analyst valuation, in green values between $30,21 and $42,00 while in light blue, 
the remaining values. It is noticeable the high sensitivity to both variables. 
Besides this, it was also studied the impact of changes in the federal income tax 
rate since President Trump established as one of the main measures for his 
mandate a reduction of federal tax rate to 15%. However, since it is not certain 
how much he will actually decrease it, it was taken 5% from current tax rate five 
times and added one time to understand the impact. The impact is substantial 
(Figure 56) and it can help WFM to survive in this tough industry environment. 
The decrease in tax rates were not included in the model’s forecasts due to the 
uncertainty of the measure’s implementation. 
Scenario Valuation 
For the scenario analysis, the more significant and unstable variables of the 
model, regarding the core operations, were studied. Thus, the opening of new 
stores in U.S. and Canada, sales per sq ft of U.S. traditional stores, 365 stores 
and Canada stores, COGS margin related to traditional stores and e-commerce 
and, lastly, online growth rate were challenged to build two scenarios. The 
assumptions for each scenario are presented in Appendix. 
On one hand, the optimistic scenario (Figure 58) incorporates five main 
features: a less intense price war in the ST, meaning higher COGS margins in 
the future; there will be more new traditional U.S. stores opening in perpetuity; an 
increase of sales per sq ft because it is assumed that the measures taken by the 
company will be more effective in the ST than what was assumed before and in 
the LT it is assumed they will grow above inflation rate; a better perception of e-
commerce by the public; and, ultimately, that WFM will not be affected by Brexit. 
According to all these assumptions, implied share price increases to $59,89 
Figure 55: Sensitivity Analysis for LT 
growth rate and unlevered beta  
Source: Analyst estimations 
Figure 56: Sensitivity Analysis for 
changes in federal tax rate               
Source: Analyst estimations 
2,0% 2,6% 3,15% 3,4% 3,7%
0,56 35,6$          42,4$          52,6$          60,4$          70,6$          
0,66 28,3$          32,8$          39,2$          43,6$          49,2$          
0,76 22,8$          26,0$          30,2$          33,1$          36,4$          
0,86 18,6$          20,9$          23,8$          25,8$          28,0$          
0,96 15,2$          16,9$          19,1$          20,4$          21,9$          
βu
g
10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
57,7$ 51,9$ 46,3$ 40,8$ 35,4$ 30,2$ 25,1$ 
Tax Rate
Optimistic Scenario
Equity Value 19 179,90$               
Imp. Share Price 59,89$                     
LT growth rate 3,72%
ROIC in 2030 13,18%
RONIC in 2030 12,82%
WACC in 2030 6,74%
Base Scenario
Equity Value 9 674,20$            
Imp. Share Price 30,21$                 
LT growth rate 3,15%
ROIC in 2030 9,71%
RONIC in 2030 9,26%
WACC in 2030 6,67%
Figure 57: Base-case scenario  
Source: Analyst estimations 
Figure 58: Optimistic-case scenario  
Source: Analyst estimations 
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with a LT growth rate of 3,7%. The ROIC and RONIC in perpetuity are expected 
to be 13,2% and 12,8%, respectively, which are higher than WACC value (6,7%). 
On the other hand, the pessimistic scenario (Figure 59) analyses with a 
negative view the same variables challenged in the optimistic scenario. The main 
changes were: there will be less new traditional U.S. stores opening in 
perpetuity due to deterioration of their sales per sq ft; sales per sq ft were defined 
to grow at inflation rate in 365 stores, UK and Canada in perpetuity; fewer stores 
in Canada; online sales growth to expand at a much lower rate which shows that 
the big sharks in e-commerce would not allow WFM to have success; lastly, price 
war will be more intense and, consequently, its margins will deteriorate even 
more compared to the base case. According to all these assumptions, implied 
share price would be $14,44 with a LT growth rate of 2,54%. The ROIC and 
RONIC in 2030 are 7,32% and 6,8%, respectively which are slightly higher than 
WACC (6,54%). 
Business Risks 
 
Evaluating the nature of the market and the situation of the industry and, 
ultimately, the recent performance of the company some risks may jeopardize 
the WFM business in the next few years. Some of these risks might be: 1) the 
deterioration of brand value and, consequently, people not be willing to pay a 
premium to purchase in WFM; 2) the even more worsening of sales per sq ft 
could lead to the closure of more stores which could, in turn, lead to the decrease 
of revenues; 3) the failure of e-commerce partnership due to the cannibalization 
from large players like Amazon could increase costs that would not be paid off; 4) 
the reduction in gross margins may not be enough to keep customers attracted to 
WFM creating serious problems for the firm; 5) the opening of new stores might 
cannibalize other existing stores instead of boosting sales; 6) the deterioration of 
the relationship between WFM and UNFI 7) the worsening of  macroeconomic 
conditions that may cause lower disposable income for families, higher 
unemployment rate, declining consumer confidence, higher prices for 
commodities and deflation environment could be responsible for decrease of 
sales and lower margins having an adversely effect in the company; 8) lastly, and 
more specific to UK, Brexit can have adverse consequences in UK’s businesses. 
Transaction 
 
WFM acquisition by Amazon was announced on 16th of June 2017 and closed 
on 29th of August. Amazon paid $42 per share plus the net debt which gives 
an EV of around $13,7 billion. The price per share means a premium of 20% 
Pessimistic Scenario
Equity Value 4 623,86$                 
Imp. Share Price 14,44$                     
LT growth rate 2,54%
ROIC in 2030 7,32%
RONIC in 2030 6,80%
WACC in 2030 6,54%
Figure 59: Pessimistic-case scenario   
Source: Analyst estimations 
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compared to the share price on 31st of May and 39% comparing to the analyst’s 
DCF valuation. The deal multiples were higher than comparable transactions 
referred above, having TV/EBIT and TV/EBITDA equal to 19,27x and 10,88x, 
respectively. So, the ultimate question is: why did Amazon pay such price? 
There are financial and strategic reasons that help to explain the premium 
offered by Amazon. First of all, Amazon had high level of excess cash which 
allowed the company to acquire WFM with no need to finance from third parties. 
Another reason is that Whole Foods Market’s acquisition allows Amazon to have 
a real and strong presence in brick-and-mortar stores which brings 
essentially three advantages for Amazon: minimizes costs of deliveries and 
returns, offers another channel where customers can buy and tunes of customer 
data since people have different behaviours in physical stores and online. This 
last point could be irrelevant for some companies but for Amazon is vital since 
customer data and its personalization is one of the keys for its success. Besides 
these reasons, the acquisition is one way to decrease the effect of seasonality 
associated to Amazon activity given that 33% of its sales occurs in the 4th 
quarter and grocery industry usually does not have seasonality. Moreover, 
Amazon can explore better the internationalization of WFM which, although it 
was not very successful in the past, does not necessarily guarantee the same 
outcome in the future since Amazon might have a better know-how. Through its 
channels and marketing/advertising expertise, Amazon can increase the 
penetration rate of private labels which might increase at the same time 
margins and loyalty, ceteris paribus. Additionally, cost efficiencies through 
centralization of products purchasing can also bring value. The capacity of 
Amazon to scale the business by aggressively opening more stores while 
decreasing prices due to cost savings can also be a very powerful tool. The 
acquisition also allows Amazon to explore more aggressively the food and 
beverages sector. Lastly, Amazon can take advantage of brick-and-mortar stores 
to sell other products, attracting customers that are not used to purchase online. 
The market reaction to the acquisition announcement was very positive for 
WFM and Amazon and negative for grocery competitors since they were afraid of 
Amazon’s effect. While Amazon and WFM stocks were up 2,8% and 27%, 
respectively, all the competitors were losing value in the late morning of 16th of 
June (SFM, Kroger and Walmart were down 14,0%, 12,9% and 5,41%, 
respectively) which means investors expected a brilliant future ahead for Amazon 
and WFM as well as negative consequences for WFM’s competitors. 
Summarising, the premium paid by Amazon is due in particular to the synergies 
with its main activity and the capacity to boost and leverage WFM business. 
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Appendix 
Revenues 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
IN-STORE SALES
US
Normal Stores
# Stores 347 381 412 433 438 450 459 468 476 484 491 498 504 509 514 519 524 529
New stores 25 34 31 21 14 12 9 9 8 8 7 7 6 5 5 5 5 5
Relocations 5 1 6 3 4 4 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Old stores 317 346 375 409 420 434 446 456 465 476 484 491 498 504 509 514 519 524
Sqft per Store 38064 38000 38573 39097 39704 40320 40946 41581 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226
Sales per sqft - old stores 985 993 975 916 884 871 875 888 907 928 947 965 985 1004 1025 1045 1066 1087
Sales per sqft - new stores 492 496 488 458 442 435 437 444 454 464 473 483 492 502 512 523 533 544
Sales per sqft - relocated stores 739 745 732 687 663 653 656 666 681 696 710 724 739 753 768 784 799 815
Total Sales US Trad. Stores 12491 13726 14862 15102 15089 15549 16246 17087 18056 18809 19485 20160 20833 21483 22129 22792 23473 24172
365 Stores
# Stores 0 0 0 3 7 11 15 19 22 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57
New stores 0 0 0 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Sq ft per Store 0 0 0 29667 29551 29435 29320 29205 29091 29091 29091 29091 29091 29091 29091 29091 29091 29091
Sales per Sq ft old 0 0 0 678 688 708 730 751 771 792 812 832 853 874 896 919 941 965
Sales per sqft new 0 0 0 339 344 354 365 375 385 396 406 416 426 437 448 459 471 483
Total  Sales 365 Stores 0 0 0 30 102 187 278 373 460 541 638 750 868 992 1121 1256 1397 1544
OUTSIDE US
Canada
# Stores 8 9 10 11 12 14 16 18 20 21 22 23 24 25 25 25 25 25
New stores 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Sqft per Store 38064 38000 38573 39097 39704 40320 40946 41581 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226 42226
Sales per Sqft old stores 1208 1137 987 838 838 860 882 904 926 949 973 998 1023 1048 1074 1101 1129 1157
Sales per sqft new stores 604 569 494 419 419 430 441 452 463 475 487 499 511 524 537 551 564 578
Total Sales Canada 345 367 362 344 383 451 541 639 743 822 884 948 1015 1084 1134 1162 1191 1221
UK
# Stores 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Sqm per Store 38064 38000 38573 39097 39097 39097 39097 39097 39097 39097 39097 39097 39097 39097 39097 39097 39097 39097
Sales per Sqft 306 295 327 307 318 327 334 346 359 368 377 387 396 406 417 427 438 449
Total Sales UK 81 101 114 108 112 115 118 122 126 130 133 136 139 143 147 150 154 158
E-commerce
Total Sales E-commerce 0 0 52 140 224 300 342 390 443 503 569 645 729 790 840 877 914 954
TOTAL SALES 12917 14194 15389 15724 15909 16602 17525 18610 19828 20804 21708 22639 23585 24492 25371 26237 27130 28049 
 
Income Statement 
(in millions dollars) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
Core Business
Sales 12917 14194 15389 15724 15909 16602 17525 18610 19828 20804 21708 22639 23585 24492 25371 26237 27130 28049
Normal stores 12917 14194 15337 15554 15583 16115 16905 17848 18926 19760 20501 21244 21987 22710 23410 24105 24819 25551
365 stores 0 0 0 30 102 187 278 373 460 541 638 750 868 992 1121 1256 1397 1544
Online 0 0 52 140 224 300 342 390 443 503 569 645 729 790 840 877 914 954
Costs of goods sold -7914 -8743 -9532 -9836 -10044 -10568 -11193 -11890 -12671 -13297 -13878 -14477 -15086 -15670 -16236 -16795 -17371 -17964
Normal stores -7914 -8743 -9500 -9728 -9833 -10249 -10785 -11387 -12075 -12607 -13080 -13553 -14028 -14489 -14935 -15379 -15834 -16302
365 stores 0 0 0 -21 -69 -128 -190 -254 -314 -369 -435 -512 -593 -677 -765 -857 -953 -1054
Online 0 0 -32 -88 -142 -191 -218 -249 -283 -321 -363 -411 -465 -504 -536 -559 -583 -608
Lease depreciation -309 -333 -362 -407 -419 -442 -465 -490 -516 -531 -554 -578 -603 -626 -649 -671 -694 -717
Gross Profit 4694 5118 5495 5481 5446 5593 5866 6230 6641 6976 7276 7584 7896 8196 8486 8771 9065 9368
S,G&A expenses -3682 -4032 -4392 -4477 -4428 -4566 -4674 -4952 -5250 -5499 -5737 -5983 -6233 -6473 -6705 -6935 -7170 -7413
Other SG&A expenses -633 -672 -720 -764 -764 -784 -798 -822 -876 -919 -959 -1000 -1042 -1082 -1121 -1159 -1199 -1240
Labor costs -2654 -2920 -3131 -3089 -3038 -3111 -3172 -3385 -3593 -3770 -3934 -4102 -4274 -4438 -4597 -4754 -4916 -5083
Depreciation & Amortization -339 -377 -439 -498 -489 -528 -553 -584 -610 -630 -658 -686 -714 -742 -769 -795 -822 -850
Advertising expense -56 -63 -89 -96 -97 -101 -107 -114 -121 -127 -133 -138 -144 -150 -155 -160 -166 -171
Marketing expense 0 0 -13 -30 -40 -42 -44 -47 -50 -52 -54 -57 -59 -61 -63 -66 -68 -70
Pre-opening expenses -52 -67 -67 -64 -52 -43 -44 -40 -37 -36 -38 -40 -41 -43 -44 -46 -47 -49
Relocation, Store Closure and Termination Costs -12 -11 -16 -13 -41 -13 -13 -9 -9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Operating Expenses -3746 -4110 -4475 -4554 -4520 -4622 -4731 -5001 -5297 -5535 -5775 -6023 -6275 -6516 -6750 -6980 -7218 -7462
Operating Income 948 1008 1020 927 926 971 1135 1229 1345 1441 1500 1561 1622 1680 1736 1791 1847 1906
Recurrent taxes -374 -402 -410 -364 -369 -387 -452 -490 -536 -574 -598 -622 -646 -669 -692 -714 -736 -759
Non-recurrent taxes 10 10 11 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NOPLAT 583 616 620 567 557 584 683 739 809 867 903 939 976 1011 1044 1077 1111 1146
Non-Core Business
Income
Investment and Other Income 11 12 17 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Expenses
One-off expenses - Asset impairment charges (2015) 0 0 -46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
One-Time Termination Charges 0 0 -34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Charge associated with the separation agreement of Walter Robb 0 0 0 0 -13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Core Income 11 12 -63 11 -2 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Non-operational taxes -4 -5 25 -4 1 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4
Non-Core Result 7 7 -38 7 -1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Financial
Financial Result (Interest expenses) 0 0 0 -41 -52 -52 -52 -52 -52 -52 -52 -52 -52 -9 0 0 0 0
Tax shield 0 0 0 16 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 3 0 0 0 0
After tax lease interest -39 -45 -47 -42 -53 -56 -59 -62 -64 -66 -69 -72 -75 -78 -80 -83 -86 -89
Net Income 551 579 536 507 471 504 599 653 721 776 809 842 876 934 971 1001 1032 1064  
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Balance Sheet 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
Core (millions in $)
Operating Assets
Operating Cash 173 190 237 314 318 332 351 372 397 416 434 453 472 490 507 525 543 561
Restricted Cash 111 109 127 122 120 120 119 124 133 139 145 151 158 164 170 175 181 187
Accounts Receivable 188 198 218 242 245 256 270 286 305 320 334 348 363 377 390 404 418 432
Inventories 414 441 500 517 527 555 588 624 665 698 729 760 792 823 853 882 912 943
PP&E 2428 2923 3163 3442 3540 3823 4005 4229 4419 4566 4765 4969 5177 5376 5569 5759 5955 6157
Goodwill 679 708 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
Prepaid expenses and Other current Assets 93 97 108 167 169 176 186 198 211 221 231 240 250 260 269 279 288 298
Deferred Income Taxes (ST) 151 168 199 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197
Deferred income taxes (LT) 72 132 144 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Other Int. Assets (net of acumulated amortization) 65 81 79 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
Capitalized operating leases 2566 2976 2985 3152 3375 3557 3744 3929 4051 4227 4408 4592 4769 4940 5109 5282 5462 5646
Total Operating Assets 6939 8023 8470 9038 9376 9900 10343 10844 11261 11669 12126 12595 13062 13510 13948 14387 14839 15305
Operating Liabilities
Accounts Payable 247 276 295 307 331 369 413 463 522 548 572 596 622 646 669 692 716 740
Accrued payroll, bonus and  benefits due team members 367 379 436 407 396 396 393 410 426 447 466 486 507 526 545 564 583 603
Other Current Liabilities 436 557 473 581 560 584 616 655 697 732 763 796 829 861 892 923 954 987
Deferred lease liabilities 500 548 587 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640
Total Operating Liabilities 1550 1760 1791 1935 1927 1988 2062 2168 2285 2367 2442 2519 2598 2673 2746 2819 2893 2969
Net Operating Assets 5389 6263 6679 7103 7449 7912 8280 8676 8976 9302 9685 10076 10464 10837 11202 11568 11946 12335
Non-Core
Non-Core Assets
Long Term Investments - available-for-sale securities 302 120 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Assets 12 24 38 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Total Non-core Assets 314 144 101 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Non-Core Liabilities
Other long-term liabilities 46 66 71 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Total Non-core Liabilities 46 66 71 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Net Non-Core 268 78 30 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48
Financial
Financial Assets
Short-Term Investments - available-for-sale securities 733 553 155 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379
Cash and cash equivalents (Excess of Cash) 117 0 0 37 0 0 249 554 944 1406 1843 2300 2781 2316 2886 3482 4098 4733
Financial Liabilities
Issuance of new debt 0 0 0 0 159 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LT capital lease obligations, less current installments 26 60 62 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 48 48 48 48 48
Current Portion of LT Debt and Capital Lease obligations 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Capitalized Operating leases (8*rent) 2566 2976 2985 3152 3375 3557 3744 3929 4051 4227 4408 4592 4769 4940 5109 5282 5462 5646
Net Financial Assets -1742 -2485 -2895 -3788 -4206 -4271 -4167 -4047 -3779 -3493 -3237 -2964 -2660 -2296 -1895 -1472 -1035 -585
Shareholders' Equity 3915 3856 3814 3267 3195 3592 4065 4581 5149 5761 6399 7064 7755 8493 9259 10048 10863 11702
Total Liabilities and Equity 8104 8720 8726 9493 9795 10319 11010 11816 12624 13494 14388 15314 16261 16245 17253 18288 19356 20457
Total Assets 8104 8720 8726 9493 9795 10319 11010 11816 12624 13494 14388 15314 16261 16245 17253 18288 19356 20457
Common stock dividends paid 519 176 186 174 163 174 207 225 249 268 279 291 302 322 335 345 356 367
Payout Ratio (only dividends) 94% 31% 35% 34% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35%
Total Transaction with Shareholders 630 557 1050 543 106 126 138 152 164 171 178 185 197 205 211 218 225
Payout Ratio (including everything) 109% 104% 207% 115% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21%  
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Free Cash Flow Maps 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
Core Business
NOPLAT 616 620 567 557 584 683 739 809 867 903 939 976 1011 1044 1077 1111 1146
D&A 377 439 498 489 528 553 584 610 630 658 686 714 742 769 795 822 850
Operational Cash Flow 993 1059 1065 1045 1112 1236 1323 1419 1497 1560 1625 1690 1753 1813 1872 1933 1996
Invested Capital - Fixed Assets 5899 6148 6594 6915 7380 7748 8158 8470 8793 9173 9561 9946 10316 10678 11042 11416 11802
Maintenance CAPEX -377 -439 -498 -489 -528 -553 -584 -610 -630 -658 -686 -714 -742 -769 -795 -822 -850
Expansion CAPEX -906 -248 -447 -321 -465 -368 -410 -312 -323 -380 -388 -384 -370 -362 -364 -375 -386
Invested Capital - NWC and Others -9 185 264 290 287 288 274 262 265 268 271 274 277 280 283 286 289
Investment in NWC and Others 89 -194 -79 -25 2 -1 14 12 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
Deferred income taxes (LT) 132 144 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Investment in Deferred income taxes (LT) -60 -12 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investment Cash Flow -877 -454 -482 -346 -463 -369 -396 -300 -327 -383 -392 -387 -373 -364 -367 -378 -389
Unlevered Operational FCF -261 166 85 211 122 314 344 509 540 520 547 588 637 680 710 733 757
Operational Non-Core Cash Flow 7 -38 7 -1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Invested Capital 78 30 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48 -48
Investment Cash Flow Non-Core 190 48 78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deferred lease liabilities 548 587 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640
Investment in Deferred lease liabilities 48 39 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Goodwill 708 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
Investment in Goodwill -29 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other intang. Assets 81 79 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
Investment in Other Int. Assets -16 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Free Cash Flow -60 216 228 209 128 321 350 516 547 527 554 595 644 686 717 740 764
Financial
Financial Result 0 0 -41 -52 -52 -52 -52 -52 -52 -52 -52 -52 -9 0 0 0 0
Tax Shield 0 0 16 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 3 0 0 0 0
Net Financial Assets -2485 -2895 -3788 -4206 -4271 -4167 -4047 -3779 -3493 -3237 -2964 -2660 -2296 -1895 -1472 -1035 -585
Investment in Net Financial Assets 743 409 893 418 65 -104 -120 -269 -286 -256 -273 -304 -364 -401 -423 -437 -451
Net Cash Transactions with Shareholders (∆ Equity in Cash) -630 -557 -1050 -543 -106 -126 -138 -152 -164 -171 -178 -185 -197 -205 -211 -218 -225
Other Comprehensive Income -8 -21 -4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
After tax lease interest -45 -47 -42 -53 -56 -59 -62 -64 -66 -69 -72 -75 -78 -80 -83 -86 -89
Financial Free Cash Flow 60 -216 -228 -209 -128 -321 -350 -516 -547 -527 -554 -595 -644 -686 -717 -740 -764  
 
Statement of Changes in Equity 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
($ in millions)
Initial Equity 3915 3856 3814 3267 3195 3592 4065 4581 5149 5761 6399 7064 7755 8493 9259 10048 10863
Comprehensive Income
Net Income 579 536 507 471 504 599 653 721 776 809 842 876 934 971 1001 1032 1064
Foreign currency translation adjustments -8 -21 -4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Comprehensive Income 571 515 503 471 504 599 653 721 776 809 842 876 934 971 1001 1032 1064
Transactions with shareholders
Dividends accrued 6 2 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dividends -176 -186 -174 -163 -174 -207 -225 -249 -268 -279 -291 -302 -322 -335 -345 -356 -367
Issuance of common stocks to team members 41 66 19 18 19 22 24 27 29 30 32 33 35 36 38 39 40
Purchase of treasury stock -578 -513 -944 -444 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tax benefits related to exercise of team member stock options 9 11 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Share-based payment expense 68 64 49 46 49 58 63 70 75 78 81 85 90 94 97 100 103
Other 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Transaction with Shareholders -630 -557 -1050 -543 -106 -126 -138 -152 -164 -171 -178 -185 -197 -205 -211 -218 -225
Shareholders' Equity 3856 3814 3267 3195 3592 4065 4581 5149 5761 6399 7064 7755 8493 9259 10048 10863 11702  
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Peer Companies 
 
 
Sprouts Farmers Market: it is a retailer of natural and organic food with 
headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona founded in 2002. SFM operates exclusively in 
United States through a chain of 253 stores with 24000 employees. 
Vitamin Natural Grocers: it is a specialty retailer of natural and organic food founded 
in 1995 with its headquarters in Lakewood, Colorado. It operates only in United 
States with 123 stores and it has 3074 employees. Its IPO was in July 2012. 
Ingles Markets: it is a supermarket chain that operates in the southeast of United 
States. It sells all type of products with an important line of organic, beverage and 
health-related items. It is headquartered in Black Mountain, North Carolina. As of 
September 2016, it operated 201 stores with 25000 employees. 
Weis Markets: it is a retailer that mainly operates in Pennsylvania and surrounding 
states. Its headquarters is in Sunbury, Pennsylvania. The chain was founded in 1912 
and as of September 2016, it had 204 stores with 23000 employees. 
 
Scenario Assumptions 
 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Base Scenario
Traditonal US Stores
Stores open 14,00 12,00 9,00 9,00 8,00 8,00 7,00 7,00 6,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00
Sales per sq ft growth -3,5% -1,5% 0,5% 1,5% 2,2% 2,3% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
365 stores
Sales per sq ft growth 1,5% 2,9% 3,1% 2,8% 2,7% 2,8% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5%
UK
Sales per sq ft growth 3,7% 2,6% 2,2% 3,7% 3,7% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5%
Canada
Stores open 1,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Sales per sq ft growth 0,0% 2,6% 2,6% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5%
Online Sales growth 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 8,0% 6,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0%
COGS margin
Traditional Stores 63,1% 63,6% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8%
Online Stores 63,1% 63,6% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8% 63,8%
Optimistic Scenario
Traditonal US Stores
Stores open 14,00 12,00 9,00 9,00 8,00 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Sales per sq ft growth -2,5% -0,5% 1,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,2% 2,2% 2,2% 2,2% 2,2% 2,2% 2,2% 2,2%
365 stores
Sales per sq ft growth 1,50% 2,9% 3,1% 2,8% 2,7% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8%
UK
Sales per sq ft growth 4,2% 4,2% 4,2% 4,2% 4,2% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7%
Canada
Stores open 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
Sales per sq ft growth 0,0% 2,7% 2,7% 2,6% 2,6% 2,6% 2,6% 2,6% 2,6% 2,6% 2,6% 2,7% 2,7% 2,7%
Online Sales growth 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 12,5% 7,5% 4,5% 4,5% 4,5%
COGS margin
Traditional Stores 62,6% 62,9% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1%
Online Stores 62,6% 62,9% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1% 63,1%
Pessimistic Scenario
Traditonal US Stores
Stores open 14 12 9 9 8 7 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Sales per sq ft growth -4,0% -2,0% 0,0% 1,0% 1,7% 2,0% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8%
365 stores
Sales per sq ft growth 1,5% 2,4% 2,6% 2,3% 2,2% 2,3% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
UK
Sales per sq ft growth 2,5% 0,0% 0,0% 2,1% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Canada
Stores open 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sales per sq ft growth 0,0% 1,8% 1,9% 1,9% 1,8% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Online Sales growth 9,0% 7,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0%
COGS margin
Traditional Stores 63,6% 64,3% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5%
Online Stores 63,6% 64,3% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5% 64,5%  
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Disclosures and Disclaimers 
 
Report  Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
of more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
 
 
This report was prepared by João Bernardo Santos Alves, a Master in Finance student of Nova School of 
Business & Economics (“Nova SBE”), within the context of the Directed Research Internship – Alternative 
Track. 
This report is issued and published exclusively for academic purposes, namely for academic evaluation and 
masters graduation purposes, within the context of said Field Lab – Equity Research. It is not to be construed 
as an offer or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. 
This report was supervised by a Nova SBE faculty member, acting merely in an academic capacity, who 
revised the valuation methodology and the financial model. 
Given the exclusive academic purpose of the reports produced by Nova SBE students, it is Nova SBE 
understanding that Nova SBE, the author, the present report and its publishing, are excluded from the 
persons and activities requiring previous registration from local regulatory authorities. As such, Nova SBE, its 
faculty and the author of this report have not sought or obtained registration with or certification as financial 
analyst by any local regulator, in any jurisdiction. In Portugal, the author of this report is not registered with or 
qualified under COMISSÃO DO MERCADO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS (“CMVM”, the Portuguese Securities Market 
Authority) as a financial analyst. No approval for publication or distribution of this report was required and/or 
obtained from any local authority, given the exclusive academic nature of the report. 
The additional disclaimers also apply: 
USA: Pursuant to Section 202 (a) (11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, neither Nova SBE nor the 
author of this report are to be qualified as an investment adviser and, thus, registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”, United States of America’s securities market authority) is not necessary. 
Neither the author nor Nova SBE receive any compensation of any kind for the preparation of the reports. 
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Germany: Pursuant to §34c of the WpHG (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, i.e., the German Securities Trading 
Act), this entity is not required to register with or otherwise notify the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (“BaFin”, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority). It should be 
noted that Nova SBE is a fully-owned state university and there is no relation between the student’s equity 
reports and any fund raising programme. 
UK: Pursuant to section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “FSMA”), for an activity to be 
a regulated activity, it must be carried on “by way of business”. All regulated activities are subject to prior 
authorization by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”). However, this report serves an exclusively 
academic purpose and, as such, was not prepared by way of business. The author - a Masters’ student - is 
the sole and exclusive responsible for the information, estimates and forecasts contained herein, and for 
the opinions expressed, which exclusively reflect his/her own judgment at the date of the report. Nova SBE 
and its faculty have no single and formal position in relation to the most appropriate valuation method, 
estimates or projections used in the report and may not be held liable by the author’s choice of the latter. 
The information contained in this report was compiled by students from public sources believed to be reliable, 
but Nova SBE, its faculty, or the students make no representation that it is accurate or complete, and accept 
no liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss resulting from the use of this report or of its content. 
Students are free to choose the target companies of the reports. Therefore, Nova SBE may start covering 
and/or suspend the coverage of any listed company, at any time, without prior notice. The students or Nova 
SBE are not responsible for updating this report, and the opinions and recommendations expressed herein 
may change without further notice. 
The target company or security of this report may be simultaneously covered by more than one student. 
Because each student is free to choose the valuation method, and make his/her own assumptions and 
estimates, the resulting projections, price target and recommendations may differ widely, even when referring 
to the same security. Moreover, changing market conditions and/or changing subjective opinions may lead to 
significantly different valuation results. Other students’ opinions, estimates and recommendations, as well as 
the advisor and other faculty members’ opinions may be inconsistent with the views expressed in this report. 
Any recipient of this report should understand that statements regarding future prospects and performance 
are, by nature, subjective, and may be fallible. 
This report does not necessarily mention and/or analyze all possible risks arising from the investment in the 
target company and/or security, namely the possible exchange rate risk resulting from the security being 
denominated in a currency either than the investor’s currency, among many other risks. 
The purpose of publishing this report is merely academic and it is not intended for distribution among private 
investors. The information and opinions expressed in this report are not intended to be available to any 
person other than Portuguese natural or legal persons or persons domiciled in Portugal. While preparing this 
report, students did not have in consideration the specific investment objectives, financial situation or 
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particular needs of any specific person. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness 
of investing in any security, namely in the security covered by this report. 
The author hereby certifies that the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his/her personal opinion 
about the target company and its securities. He/ She has not received or been promised any direct or indirect 
compensation for expressing the opinions or recommendation included in this report. 
[If applicable, it shall be added: “While preparing the report, the author may have performed an internship 
(remunerated or not) in [insert the Company’s name]. This Company may have or have had an interest in the 
covered company or security” and/ or “A draft of the reports have been shown to the covered company’s 
officials (Investors Relations Officer or other), mainly for the purpose of correcting inaccuracies, and later 
modified, prior to its publication.”]  
The content of each report has been shown or made public to restricted parties prior to its publication in Nova 
SBE’s website or in Bloomberg Professional, for academic purposes such as its distribution among faculty 
members for students’ academic evaluation. 
Nova SBE is a state-owned university, mainly financed by state subsidies, students tuition fees and 
companies, through donations, or indirectly by hiring educational programs, among other possibilities. Thus, 
Nova SBE may have received compensation from the target company during the last 12 months, related to its 
fund raising programs, or indirectly through the sale of educational, consulting or research services. 
Nevertheless, no compensation eventually received by Nova SBE is in any way related to or dependent on 
the opinions expressed in this report. The Nova School of Business and Economics does not deal for or 
otherwise offer any investment or intermediation services to market counterparties, private or intermediate 
customers. 
This report may not be reproduced, distributed or published, in whole or in part, without the explicit previous 
consent of its author, unless when used by Nova SBE for academic purposes only. At any time, Nova SBE 
may decide to suspend this report reproduction or distribution without further notice. Neither this document 
nor any copy of it may be taken, transmitted or distributed, directly or indirectly, in any country either than 
Portugal or to any resident outside this country. The dissemination of this document other than in Portugal or 
to Portuguese citizens is therefore prohibited and unlawful. 
 
